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dc.contributor.advisorMikołajewicz, Jarosław-
dc.contributor.advisorOchmański, Jerzy Witold-
dc.contributor.authorBiałkowski, Michał-
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-03T11:52:37Z-
dc.date.available2017-03-03T11:52:37Z-
dc.date.issued2015-06-
dc.identifier.citationM. Białkowski, The derivative concept of legal interpretation, Studia Prawa Publicznego 2015 nr 2 (10), ss. 153-165.pl_PL
dc.identifier.isbn978-83-232-2947-6-
dc.identifier.issn2300-3936-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10593/17503-
dc.description.abstractThe dominant thinking on legal interpretation in contemporary Polish legal doctrine is the derivative concept of interpretation of Professor Maciej Zieliński. One of the most important features of this concept is that it distinguishes legal provision from legal norm. Legal provision is the statement of the fundamental text of the legal act taken from dot to dot, whereas legal standard is the standard of conduct which was established or recognised by the authorised body of the state, in the traditional jurisprudence of the tripartite structure (hypothesis–instruction–sanction). The derivative concept of legal interpretation also rejects the principle clara non sunt interpretanda and replaces it with the principle omnia sunt interpretanda. But the most derivative part of the concept is the accurate identification of features of the language of Polish legal texts, such as its specific variability as it takes place somehow beyond the legal text. Among other features characteristic of Polish legal texts we could mention that they are written at a ‘descriptive level’ and read at a ‘normative level’ (the quasi-idiomacity of Polish legal texts), the fragmentation of legal standards (above all syntactic and semantic) and the presence of vague or imprecise turns of phrase.. M. Zieliński grouped directives of interpretation in his concept into three phases : ordering, reconstructive and perceptual. According to M. Zieliński legal interpretation starts with the determination of the state of the law applicable to the case and of the content of the interpreted provision. The aim of the second (reconstructive) phase is to obtain the standard expression including the determination of the recipient (subject to which the order or prohibition of action is applied) and the determination of the circumstances in which the specified behaviour is ordered or prohibited. The standard expression after this phase does not yet constitute the legal standard owing to its potential ambiguity, which is finally clarified in the perceptual phase of interpretation.pl_PL
dc.language.isoengpl_PL
dc.publisherWydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewiczapl_PL
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesspl_PL
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dc.rights.uriAn error occurred getting the license - uri.*
dc.subjectlegal interpretationpl_PL
dc.subjecttheory of lawpl_PL
dc.subjectderivative concept of legal interpretationpl_PL
dc.subjectprinciple clara non sunt interpretandapl_PL
dc.subjectlegal provisionpl_PL
dc.titleThe derivative concept of legal interpretationpl_PL
dc.typeArtykułpl_PL
dc.description.number2 (10) / 2015pl_PL
dc.description.pageof153pl_PL
dc.description.pageto165pl_PL
dc.description.journaltitleStudia Prawa Publicznegopl_PL
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