Problem trafu moralnego i winy według Thomasa Nagela i Norvina Richardsa Próba uzupełnienia krytyki Richardsa
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Date
2012
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Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza, Wydział Teologiczny
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The Problem of Moral Luck by Thomas Nagel and Norvin Richards.
Abstract
The article discusses the problem of moral luck described by T. Nagel and B. Williams. It also
presents the critique of N. Richards. In terms of Nagel moral luck causes a paradox: we judge
morally random acts and break the principle of estimating only those acts which are under the control
of the perpetrator. Richards criticizes the sole use of the criterion of effects of the act, without
intentions. This criticism is extended and includes the objection of too far-reaching generalization
of the role of luck made by Nagel.
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Keywords
moral luck, constitutive luck, T. Nagel, B. Williams, N. Richards, consequentialism, determinism, indeterminism
Citation
Filozofia chrześcijańska, 2012, tom 9, s. 71-89