Problem trafu moralnego i winy według Thomasa Nagela i Norvina Richardsa Próba uzupełnienia krytyki Richardsa

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Date

2012

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Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza, Wydział Teologiczny

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The Problem of Moral Luck by Thomas Nagel and Norvin Richards.

Abstract

The article discusses the problem of moral luck described by T. Nagel and B. Williams. It also presents the critique of N. Richards. In terms of Nagel moral luck causes a paradox: we judge morally random acts and break the principle of estimating only those acts which are under the control of the perpetrator. Richards criticizes the sole use of the criterion of effects of the act, without intentions. This criticism is extended and includes the objection of too far-reaching generalization of the role of luck made by Nagel.

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Keywords

moral luck, constitutive luck, T. Nagel, B. Williams, N. Richards, consequentialism, determinism, indeterminism

Citation

Filozofia chrześcijańska, 2012, tom 9, s. 71-89

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ISBN

ISSN

1734-4530

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Rights Creative Commons

Creative Commons License

Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Biblioteka Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Ministerstwo Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego