Wittgenstein: od etyki do ślepego stosowania reguł i z powrotem
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Date
2018
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Wydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Filozofii UAM
Title alternative
Wittgenstein: From Ethics to Blind Rule-Following and Back Again
Abstract
The paper discusses Wittgenstein’s approaches to ethics within two contrastive contexts, e.g., pragmatism and cooperative-discursive normative practice. The first section revisits the fiasco of his early “negative” ethics. The second section subsequently shows how Wittgenstein’s mature concept of blind rule-following displaces normativity but simultaneously becomes the key predictor for discourse ethics (or, rather, a specific kind of it). The final section discusses the pros and cons of finitism in the light of contemporary philosophy of mind. As a conclusion, the author provides evidence for her hypothesis that there is no normative (embodied) mind without a manifest normative competence, which includes moral judgment and discursive competence.
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Keywords
Wittgenstein, ethics, pragmatism, blind rule-following, considered and deliberated judgment, Discourse Ethics, Habermas, Lind, Kohlberg, Tomasello, Gehlen, Bloor, Brożek
Citation
Ethics in Progress, Volume 9 (2018), Issue 2, pp. 131-161.