Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10593/11471
Title: Spór o naturę świadomości
Other Titles: The problem of consciousness
Authors: Polcyn, Karol
Keywords: consciousness
materialism
conceivability
possibility
the knowledge argument
phenomenal concepts
Issue Date: 2013
Publisher: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Filozofii
Citation: Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna, Tom 2, 2013, Nr 1, s. 200-212.
Abstract: Although phenomenal consciousness resists explanation in physical terms, it remains an open question whether or not consciousness is an intrinsically physical phenomenon since it remains an open question whether or not conscious states are identical with physical states. This question is one of the key issues of debate in contemporary philosophy of mind. Here I survey some of the key arguments designed to show that conscious states are not physical states. I argue that materialists have no satisfactory response to those arguments.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10593/11471
DOI: 10.14746/fped.2013.2.1.10
ISBN: 978-83-7092-157-6
ISSN: 2299-1875
Appears in Collections:Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna, 2013, Tom 2 Nr 1

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