Spór o naturę świadomości

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dc.contributor.authorPolcyn, Karol
dc.date.accessioned2014-09-12T08:42:45Z
dc.date.available2014-09-12T08:42:45Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.description.abstractAlthough phenomenal consciousness resists explanation in physical terms, it remains an open question whether or not consciousness is an intrinsically physical phenomenon since it remains an open question whether or not conscious states are identical with physical states. This question is one of the key issues of debate in contemporary philosophy of mind. Here I survey some of the key arguments designed to show that conscious states are not physical states. I argue that materialists have no satisfactory response to those arguments.pl_PL
dc.description.articlenumber10pl_PL
dc.description.journaltitleFilozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratycznapl_PL
dc.description.number1pl_PL
dc.description.pageof200pl_PL
dc.description.pageto212pl_PL
dc.description.tome2pl_PL
dc.identifier.citationFilozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna, Tom 2, 2013, Nr 1, s. 200-212.pl_PL
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.14746/fped.2013.2.1.10
dc.identifier.isbn978-83-7092-157-6
dc.identifier.issn2299-1875
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10593/11471
dc.language.isoplpl_PL
dc.publisherWydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Filozofiipl_PL
dc.subjectconsciousnesspl_PL
dc.subjectmaterialismpl_PL
dc.subjectconceivabilitypl_PL
dc.subjectpossibilitypl_PL
dc.subjectthe knowledge argumentpl_PL
dc.subjectphenomenal conceptspl_PL
dc.titleSpór o naturę świadomościpl_PL
dc.title.alternativeThe problem of consciousnesspl_PL
dc.typeArtykułpl_PL

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Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna, 2013, Tom 2 Nr 1