Spór o naturę świadomości
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Date
2013
Authors
Advisor
Editor
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Filozofii
Title alternative
The problem of consciousness
Abstract
Although phenomenal consciousness resists explanation
in physical terms, it remains an open question whether or
not consciousness is an intrinsically physical phenomenon since
it remains an open question whether or not conscious states are
identical with physical states. This question is one of the key
issues of debate in contemporary philosophy of mind. Here I survey
some of the key arguments designed to show that conscious
states are not physical states. I argue that materialists have no
satisfactory response to those arguments.
Description
Sponsor
Keywords
consciousness, materialism, conceivability, possibility, the knowledge argument, phenomenal concepts
Citation
Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna, Tom 2, 2013, Nr 1, s. 200-212.
ISBN
978-83-7092-157-6