Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10593/5236
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorAlbiński, Tomasz-
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-14T07:37:19Z-
dc.date.available2013-03-14T07:37:19Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.citationFilozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna, Tom 1 (2012) Nr 1, s. 81-92.pl_PL
dc.identifier.isbn2299-1875-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10593/5236-
dc.description.abstractAlthough there is a disagreement about how Putnam’s argument should be understood, it is possible to point to several elements of this argument which are common for many different reconstructions. In this paper I have tried to show that not all of them are unquestionable. And I want to propose a new way in which self-refutation of statement „I am a brain in a vat” may be understood. A form of this reconstruction is neutral for controversy about metaphysical realism or skepticism – it differs from the argument suggested by Putnam’s text. But I think that a story about envatted brains is simply a story about a language.pl_PL
dc.language.isoplpl_PL
dc.publisherWydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Filozofiipl_PL
dc.subjectbrains in vatspl_PL
dc.subjectPutnampl_PL
dc.subjectrealismpl_PL
dc.subjectMatrixpl_PL
dc.titleMózgi w naczyniupl_PL
dc.title.alternativeBrains in a vatpl_PL
dc.typeArtykułpl_PL
Appears in Collections:Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna, 2012, Tom 1 Nr 1

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
12-Albinski.pdf414.68 kBAdobe PDFView/Open
Show simple item record



This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License Creative Commons