Sesja o narratywizmie
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2013
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Krzysztof Brzechczyn, Polish reception of the discussion. Between positivism and narrativism in the methodology of history. Introduction
Proposed by Hempel, the deductive-nomological model of explanation initiated a lively discussion about the status and peculiarities of explanation in history, lasting more than half a century in the Western philosophy of history. An appearance of narrativism was interpreted as an alternative to hitherto dominant positivist philosophy of history. A peculiarity of the development of the methodology of humanities in Poland at the end of 1960s was the appearance of the Poznań School of Methodology which proposed a naturalistic but anti-positivist scientific program. Dominant position of this school caused delayed reception of narrativism in philosophy of the humanities in Poland. It is claimed that there were methodological, and ideological reasons as well as differences in the style of doing science which hindered spread of this approach. Therefore, the full popularization of narrativism was possible in Poland after 1989.
Chris Lorenz, Exploration between philosophy and history This introduction summarizes the basic ideas behind the articles collected in my book: “Przekraczanie granic”. The first basic idea is the idea that the writing of history has a ‘border crossing’ character, meaning that history writing involves bordercrossings 1. between history and philosophy, and 2. between history and ‘politics’ in a broad sense. The second basic idea is that the dialectical mechanism of ‘inversion’ (of ‘negation’ and of ‘the unity of opposites’) is fundamental for our understanding of debates in philosophy of history and in historiography. The third idea is that interesting prejudices and other assumptions in both philosophy and in history are found by contrast, not by analysis (Feyerabend). Analysis of controversies is therefore the most fruitful point of departure in philosophy of history and in historiography. Because all key ideas in the humanities are ‘essentially contested concepts’ (W. B. Gallie) controversies are the ‘normal’ discursive condition in the humanities.
Juliusz Iwanicki, Beyond or Between Positivism and Narrativism? Chris Lorenz’s philosophy of history is trying to go beyond the current dispute. Lorenz considers the sense of realism in historiography, criticizing the extremely idealistic arguments. His project of historiography is to be rational and comparative design, using interdisciplinary methods. Dutch author speaks to postmodern philosophy of history He says that too many literature and aesthetics in historiography leads to insoluble problems. Lorenz suggests a third return in historiography - return factual. A new way of thinking the author tends to use a version of the philosophy of science and epistemology in appreciation of the role of historiography
Ewa Domańska, Chris Lorenz's idea of conceptual inversion The text deals with Chris Lorenz’s idea of conceptual inversion understood as epistemological blockade that stands as a barrier of development of the humanities and social sciences. According to Lorenz, the methodological and theoretical views of scientific programmes embody negations (i.e. inversions) of the views being criticized by them. Because of this process many of the conceptual problems connected with the criticized positions survive. The author asks two questions: 1) about the relation between Lorenz's idea of conceptual inversion and Imre Lakatos’ idea of reconfigurations of research programmes? and 2) about possible common ground on which Lorenz's interest in empiricism emerging out of his criticism of narrativism, and Domańska's interest in new empiricism related to posthumanism (also critical of textual constructivism) could meet?
Monika Bobako, Postcoloniol theory and the false dichotomies The text focuses on the very conceptual framework that structures Chris Lorenz’s argumentation in his book “Przekraczanie granic”. The framework is based on the contraposition of the two epistemological perspectives named as “objectivism” and “relativism” that are both supposed to be overcome in Lorenz’s own analysis. The author of the text claims, however, that this framework is responsible for a number of interpretative inadequacies in Lorenz’ book - mainly because it is unable to grasp the ways in which power relations influence knowledge production processes and to account for the situatedness of any knowledge, including the one produced in a discipline of history.
Krzysztof Brzechczyn, ldealizational status of scientific laws and their applicability in the research practice of historians Chris Lorenz describing “theoretical historical debate” on the status of scientific laws mentioned about standpoint represented by Nancy Cartwright. According to him, this post-positivistic approach introduced new perspectives to understanding of lawfulness. The purpose of this paper is to present assumptions of another post-positivistic approach to science, namely an idealizational theory of science and to paraphrase in the notion apparatus of this approach some problems posed by Lorenz like the issue of accuracy of explanation.
Aviezer Tucker, On “strudel and apples” theory of historiography. Reply to Chris Lorenz Narrative philosophies of historiography and the positivist approach to the philosophy of historiography share an emphasis on analyzing the writings of historians, rather than their research and methods of inference, confirmation and justification. But neither approach to the philosophy of historiography asks the question about the relation of historiography with the evidence. There are no ‘facts’ in historiography, distinct atomic units that need to be selected and then put together in the historian's narrative workshop. Instead, the historian is searching for relevant evidence to infer from representations of the past that include explanations and causal relations. Since it is trivially true that all present phenomena are the effects of the past the historian requires information theories that tell which present phenomena are likely to preserve which types of information about the past. The forging of a narrative is only the last stage in a long process of inference.
Hayden White, On the research and the writing phase of the historian's work This comment on Chris Lorenz’s comment on my work indicates a number of typical failings of reviewers of which Lorenz’s comments on my talk are typical. One, like most philosophers Lorenz’s treats my work as a whole rather than individual works as if it were written and published at the same time. He finds inconsistencies or contradictions between works written many years apart. My response is that many of these inconsistencies are a result of changes in my point of view over time. Secondly, instead of quoting a passage from my work and criticizing it, Lorenz typically paraphrases an argument and then proceeds to criticize his own paraphrase. Often I do not recognize the paraphrase as a position I hold. Third, I hold that historical writing is often and should be more associative than logical, more poetic than technical. Fourth, about causality in history, I do not think that we have any examples of a universal causal law of historical change or structure. So his demand for a causal law from me is beside the point.
Chris Lorenz, Reply to my Critics In this reply to my critics (Monika Bobako, Krzysztof Brzechczyn, Ewa Domańska, Juliusz lwanicki, Aviezer Tucker, Hayden White) I am answering several critical arguments that have been formulated concerning my “Bordercrossings”. First, I dismantle the critique that I am subscribing to some version of “covering law explanation.”. Second, I clarify in what - limited - sense I find Lakatos ideas concerning “scientific research programmes” fruitful for philosophy of history. The cognitive and political Doppelexistenz of theories in the human sciences explains why epistemological analyses always need to be complemented by practical analyses. Third, I defend my “double focus” against the postmodern critique that my “internal realism” is “powerblind”, and fourth, against the critique that “scientific history” is “beyond politics”. Fifth and last I argue that in criticizing positions it is fruitful also to include the discussions about them in the critical argument.
Chris Lorenz, Exploration between philosophy and history This introduction summarizes the basic ideas behind the articles collected in my book: “Przekraczanie granic”. The first basic idea is the idea that the writing of history has a ‘border crossing’ character, meaning that history writing involves bordercrossings 1. between history and philosophy, and 2. between history and ‘politics’ in a broad sense. The second basic idea is that the dialectical mechanism of ‘inversion’ (of ‘negation’ and of ‘the unity of opposites’) is fundamental for our understanding of debates in philosophy of history and in historiography. The third idea is that interesting prejudices and other assumptions in both philosophy and in history are found by contrast, not by analysis (Feyerabend). Analysis of controversies is therefore the most fruitful point of departure in philosophy of history and in historiography. Because all key ideas in the humanities are ‘essentially contested concepts’ (W. B. Gallie) controversies are the ‘normal’ discursive condition in the humanities.
Juliusz Iwanicki, Beyond or Between Positivism and Narrativism? Chris Lorenz’s philosophy of history is trying to go beyond the current dispute. Lorenz considers the sense of realism in historiography, criticizing the extremely idealistic arguments. His project of historiography is to be rational and comparative design, using interdisciplinary methods. Dutch author speaks to postmodern philosophy of history He says that too many literature and aesthetics in historiography leads to insoluble problems. Lorenz suggests a third return in historiography - return factual. A new way of thinking the author tends to use a version of the philosophy of science and epistemology in appreciation of the role of historiography
Ewa Domańska, Chris Lorenz's idea of conceptual inversion The text deals with Chris Lorenz’s idea of conceptual inversion understood as epistemological blockade that stands as a barrier of development of the humanities and social sciences. According to Lorenz, the methodological and theoretical views of scientific programmes embody negations (i.e. inversions) of the views being criticized by them. Because of this process many of the conceptual problems connected with the criticized positions survive. The author asks two questions: 1) about the relation between Lorenz's idea of conceptual inversion and Imre Lakatos’ idea of reconfigurations of research programmes? and 2) about possible common ground on which Lorenz's interest in empiricism emerging out of his criticism of narrativism, and Domańska's interest in new empiricism related to posthumanism (also critical of textual constructivism) could meet?
Monika Bobako, Postcoloniol theory and the false dichotomies The text focuses on the very conceptual framework that structures Chris Lorenz’s argumentation in his book “Przekraczanie granic”. The framework is based on the contraposition of the two epistemological perspectives named as “objectivism” and “relativism” that are both supposed to be overcome in Lorenz’s own analysis. The author of the text claims, however, that this framework is responsible for a number of interpretative inadequacies in Lorenz’ book - mainly because it is unable to grasp the ways in which power relations influence knowledge production processes and to account for the situatedness of any knowledge, including the one produced in a discipline of history.
Krzysztof Brzechczyn, ldealizational status of scientific laws and their applicability in the research practice of historians Chris Lorenz describing “theoretical historical debate” on the status of scientific laws mentioned about standpoint represented by Nancy Cartwright. According to him, this post-positivistic approach introduced new perspectives to understanding of lawfulness. The purpose of this paper is to present assumptions of another post-positivistic approach to science, namely an idealizational theory of science and to paraphrase in the notion apparatus of this approach some problems posed by Lorenz like the issue of accuracy of explanation.
Aviezer Tucker, On “strudel and apples” theory of historiography. Reply to Chris Lorenz Narrative philosophies of historiography and the positivist approach to the philosophy of historiography share an emphasis on analyzing the writings of historians, rather than their research and methods of inference, confirmation and justification. But neither approach to the philosophy of historiography asks the question about the relation of historiography with the evidence. There are no ‘facts’ in historiography, distinct atomic units that need to be selected and then put together in the historian's narrative workshop. Instead, the historian is searching for relevant evidence to infer from representations of the past that include explanations and causal relations. Since it is trivially true that all present phenomena are the effects of the past the historian requires information theories that tell which present phenomena are likely to preserve which types of information about the past. The forging of a narrative is only the last stage in a long process of inference.
Hayden White, On the research and the writing phase of the historian's work This comment on Chris Lorenz’s comment on my work indicates a number of typical failings of reviewers of which Lorenz’s comments on my talk are typical. One, like most philosophers Lorenz’s treats my work as a whole rather than individual works as if it were written and published at the same time. He finds inconsistencies or contradictions between works written many years apart. My response is that many of these inconsistencies are a result of changes in my point of view over time. Secondly, instead of quoting a passage from my work and criticizing it, Lorenz typically paraphrases an argument and then proceeds to criticize his own paraphrase. Often I do not recognize the paraphrase as a position I hold. Third, I hold that historical writing is often and should be more associative than logical, more poetic than technical. Fourth, about causality in history, I do not think that we have any examples of a universal causal law of historical change or structure. So his demand for a causal law from me is beside the point.
Chris Lorenz, Reply to my Critics In this reply to my critics (Monika Bobako, Krzysztof Brzechczyn, Ewa Domańska, Juliusz lwanicki, Aviezer Tucker, Hayden White) I am answering several critical arguments that have been formulated concerning my “Bordercrossings”. First, I dismantle the critique that I am subscribing to some version of “covering law explanation.”. Second, I clarify in what - limited - sense I find Lakatos ideas concerning “scientific research programmes” fruitful for philosophy of history. The cognitive and political Doppelexistenz of theories in the human sciences explains why epistemological analyses always need to be complemented by practical analyses. Third, I defend my “double focus” against the postmodern critique that my “internal realism” is “powerblind”, and fourth, against the critique that “scientific history” is “beyond politics”. Fifth and last I argue that in criticizing positions it is fruitful also to include the discussions about them in the critical argument.
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Keywords
filozofia historii, philosophy of history, historiografia, historiography, narratywizm, narrativism, Poznańska Szkoła Metodologiczna, Poznań School of Methodology, pozytywzm, positivism, post-fundamentalizm, post-foundationalism, relatywizm, relativism, obiektywizm, objectivism, pojęciowe odwrócenie, conceptual inversion, przeszłość historyczna, historical past, praktyczna przeszłość, practical past, polityka historii, politics of history, Frank Ankersmit, Hayden White, interdyscyplinarność, interdysciplinarity, analityczna filozofia historii, analytical philosophy of history, teoria historii, historical theory, program badawczy, research programme, empiryzm, empiricism, teoria postkolonialna, postcolonial theory, idealizacyjna teoria nauki, idealizational theory of science, idealizacja, idealization, wyjaśnianie, explanation, evidence, dane empiryczne, informacja, information, uzasadnienie, justification, narracja, narrative, sprzeczność, contradiction, parafraza, paraphrase, przyczynowość w historii, causality in history, pisanie, writing, dedukcyjno-nomologiczny model wyjaśniania, covering law model of explanation, realizm wewnętrzny, internal realism, Imre Lakatos, Chris Lorenz, Przekraczanie granic, Bordercrossings, Aviezer Tucker
Citation
Ruch Filozoficzny, 2013, LXX, nr 3